Philosophy is the search for the large patterns of the world and of the large patterns of experience, perceptual, theoretical, . . . , aesthetic, and practical - the patterns that, regardless of specific contents, characterize the main types of experience. In this book I carry out my search for the large patterns of practical experience: the experience of deliberation, of recognition of duties and their conflicts, of attempts to guide other person's conduct, of deciding to act, of influencing the (...) physical world with one's doings, and the like. This is the experience that makes possible our social life, the formulation of plans for teamwork, the building of institutions, the development of nations, and the adoption of the ideal of morality. Here I develop a network of theories about the most fundamental aspects of practical thinking: what is thought in such thinking; what makes that thinking correct; what makes it practical; and the structure of the doings that accrue to the world when such thinking is effective. I have attempted to build each theory in sufficient detail, so that it il luminates its subject matter with a certain degree of fullness. But I have also aimed at producing an harmonious system of theories, so that the grand pattern of practical thinking can be admired, not only for the beauty of the separate structures of its parts, but also for its architectonic unity. Chapter 1 gives the details of the many facets of this project and discusses some methodological techniques. (shrink)

Studies in Wilfrid Sellars' philosophy: Aune, B. Sellars on practical reason.--Castañeda, H.-N. Some reflections on Wilfrid Sellars' theory of intentions.--Donagan, A. Determinism and freedom: Sellars and the reconciliationist thesis.--Robinson, W. S. The legend of the given.--Clark, R. The sensuous content of perception.--Grossmann, R. Perceptual objects, elementary particles, and emergent properties.--Rosenberg, J. F. The elusiveness of categories, the Archimedean dilemma, and the nature of man: a study in Sellarsian metaphysics.--Turnbull, R. G. Things, natures, and properties.--Wells, R. The indispensable word "now."--Van Fraassen, (...) B. C. Theories and counterfactuals.--Harman, G. H. Wilfrid Sellars' Theory of induction.--Sellarsiana: Sellars, W. Autobiographical reflections.--Sellars, W. The structure of knowledge. Lecture I, perception. Lecture II, minds. Lecture III, epistemic principles.--Wilfrid Sellars' Philosophical bibliography. (p. 349-353). (shrink)

One of the fundamental issues in visual awareness is how we are able to perceive the scene in front of our eyes on time despite the delay in processing visual information. The prediction theory postulates that our visual system predicts the future to compensate for such delays. On the other hand, the postdiction theory postulates that our visual awareness is inevitably a delayed product. In the present study we used flash-lag paradigms in motion and color domains and examined how the (...) perception of visual information at the time of flash is influenced by prior and subsequent visual events. We found that both types of event additively influence the perception of the present visual image, suggesting that our visual awareness results from joint contribution of predictive and postdictive mechanisms. (shrink)

O presente texto resultou da tentativa de compreender/descrever os mecanismos e as relações de poder/saber, que, na escola, produzem saberes e práticas, a partir da relação entre tais elementos e as normatizações oferecidas pelas políticas públicas para a educação.

En este ensayo propongo un modelo teórico para comprender el significado y alcance de los acuerdos racionales a partir de una concepción determinada de las relaciones entre justificación y verdad. Desde este modelo, al que denomino “acuerdo como signo”, se puede sostener que no todo consenso racional que surge dentro de una comunidad humana, incluidas las científicas, tiene por qué remitir única y exclusivamente a las creencias de ese grupo social y a sus modos internos de justificarlas sin que ellas (...) supongan nunca una ventana abierta al mundo, como sostiene sin asomo de dudas el etnocentrismo de Rorty. Frente al modelo propuesto y valorado desde él, el modelo que sostiene Rorty supone un caso de sinécdoque. (shrink)

Vulnerability has become part of our everyday vocabulary. We are used to hearing that we ought to act so as to protect the highly vulnerable; the qualifier suggests that we are all vulnerable. In addition to being of contemporary relevance, the notion of vulnerability has also been at the heart of philosophical reflection since the birth of the discipline, playing a vital role across many different traditions. Its prevalence is unsurprising. Vulnerability, which partially defines us as human beings, has appeared (...) in many guises: mortality, finitude, sin, ignorance, etc. However, no attempt has yet been made to fully apply the notion of vulnerability to the domains of epistemology and the philosophy of science, to relate it to our general human vulnerability, and to explore the wide range of consequences that derive from it. The contributors of this book fill this gap; they present new approaches to classical problems. They highlight different aspects of our cognitive vulnerability, from issues related to the realism/antirealism debate to reflections on epistemic success and trust. (shrink)

In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations (...) that are not merely logical. These are psychological and epistemological in nature. However, none of these considerations is convincing. (shrink)

Son muchas las cuestiones que en la reflexión epistemológica contemporánea se han ido acumulando en torno a la doctrina coherentista de la verdad y la justificación. En este artículo propongo un conjunto de distinciones sistemáticamente organizadas para orientarse en la forma en que todos estos problemas encajan entre sí. Fundamentalmente estas distinciones tiene que ver con los aspectos descriptivos y prescriptivos que tienen las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cuál ha sido la creencia que pide paso en nuestro sistema de creencias? ¿Es racional (...) aceptarla? ¿Cómo se ha realizado lógicamente la acomodación de la nueva creencia? ¿Se ha hecho siguiendo procedimientos racionales fiables? ¿Cómo se ha formado de hecho el sistema de creencias del que partimos? ¿Ha sido racional este proceso de formación? ¿Qué estructura tiene nuestro sistema de creencias? ¿Podemos revisar racionalmente esta estructura? ¿Es verdadero o racional el sistema de creencias resultante? (shrink)

This paper addresses four different, albeit related, issues concerning Hilary Putnam's fact/value entanglement theory. It is organized around a series of questions. First, what set of problems does the theory attempt to resolve? The revision of the empiricists and the positivist traditions will be the main concern of this first section. Secondly, how does the notion of "fact/value entanglement" solves these problems? I argue that while Putnam has persuasively defended the possibility of an entanglement between descriptive functions and evaluative functions (...) at the level of language use, he nevertheless provides us with only indirect indications about the existence and properties of the bearers of this kind of entanglement; namely the assumed existence of thick ethical concepts and their necessity for some central human practices. These indirect signs are not sufficient to buttress Putnam's entanglement thesis between facts and values. Thirdly, what are the most appropriate candidates to play the role of bearers of the description/evaluation entanglement? I challenge the claim that the ontological notion of entanglement between facts and values, itself obscure, is indispensable. Instead, I argue that we can substitute the idea of fact/value entanglement for the simpler, and less problematic, notion of human action. Finally, does Putnam commit a petitio pincipii when he attempts to lay down the criteria by which to judge if a thick ethical concept is being appropriately used in a given situation? I argue that Putnam faces what I shall call "Nietzsche's problem" - the problem of not prejudging, in giving the relevant examples for the discussion, how the situation should be morally valued. (shrink)

En este ensayo se trata de analizar algunas ideas pujantes que, desde la Ilustración, se han defendido sobre las relaciones entre los individuos y la historia gracias a las cuales se ha visto la posibilidad de compaginar los fines particulares del individuo con fines universales. También se estudian algunas teorías que suponen el desmoronamiento progresivo de este planteamiento.

Casado, María y López Baroni, Manuel Jesús, Manual de bioética laica (I). Cuestiones clave, Barcelona, Observatori de Bioética i Dret, Univesitat de Barcelona, 2018, 219 pp.

The aim of this paper is to study an early Spanish translation of Utopia that has not received much scholarly attention. We are referring to the manuscript II/1087 of the Real Biblioteca de Palacio, an anonymous text without explicit date that is still unpublished although it is most probably the first complete rendering into a vernacular language of Thomas More's work. We cast light on the date of composition of the manuscript as well as the Latin text used by the (...) anonymous translator. We also analyse the circumstances involved in the making of the text and we ponder the fidelity of the translation and the quality of the Spanish version by comparing it with the Latin text of Utopia. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the anonymous translator. (shrink)

In this essay I shall analyze same main ideas that, from the Enlightenment onwards, have been defended about the relationships between individuals and history. According to these relationships it is always possible to coordinate the aims of particular people with universal aims. I shall also study some theories that imply the collapse of this approach.

This article aims to study the coordination of the defenders’ tactical and technical behaviour of successful teams to recover the ball according to contextual variables. A total of 15,369 events and 49 to 12,398 different patterns in 32 games of the 2014 FIFA World Cup’s play-offs were detected and analysed. Results evidenced a T-pattern of the first defender pressuring the ball carrier and his teammates concentrating at the same zone to cover him or space, leading to ball recovery. Field zones, (...) first defender tactical and technical behaviours, and ball carrier first touch constituted opportunities for defenders to coordinate themselves. Moreover, the third defender had a predominant role in his teammates’ temporisation and covering zone behaviours. In the draw, first half, second-tier quality of opponent and play-offs excluding third place and final matches, the ball regularly shifted from upper to lower field zones in short periods, resulting in ball recovery or shot on goal conceded. Defenders performed behaviours farther from the ball carrier, and player-marking were most recurrent to an effective defence. This study’s findings could help coaches give specific tips to players regarding interpersonal coordination in defence and set strategies to make tactical behaviour emerge globally. (shrink)

In this paper I shall briefly analyze Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s divergent reactions against the positivist stance on natural science and on the new cultural role that philosophy should play in relation to science. To a great extent, their philosophies can be considered as a departure from positivism, although for quite different reasons. I shall argue that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, took positivism as a starting point that he tried to overcome from within. This endeavor led him to defend some theses (...) of a pragmatist flavour as well as a peculiar type of radical agnosticism on ontological and epistemological issues. Husserl, however, considered that positivism was a dead-end for philosophy. Positivism has beheaded philosophy as a consequence of advancing a reductive view of science. Phenomenology is the attempt to understand the genetic and subjective processes that have ended up in an objective and scientific image of the world. (shrink)